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1. INTRODUCTION
Speech is one of the most fundamental forms of
communication available to mankind. Because of its
continuing importance in modern communication systems,
protecting confidential conversations remains a
problem of great importance.
There are, essentially, two fundamental methods for
securing speech conmunications, namely "analogue" and
"digital". These two words describe the different
forms of output for these two types of security device.
In an analogue encryptor, the output is an analogue
signal which is a transform of the original speech
signal (where this transform normally takes place in
the time and/or frequency domains), whereas the output
from a digital encryptor is simply a sequence of binary
digits.
The chief advantage of using an analogue encryptor is
that (by a suitable choice for the encrypting
transformation) the scrambled signal can be kept to
the same bandwidth as the original speech signal. If
this is the case, then the same transmission medium
can be used for the encrypted signal as was used for
the original "clear" speech signal. This has obvious
advantages, especially if, as can be arranged, the
encrypted speech signal has essentially the same
robustness against channel noise as does the clear
speech. However, because the transmitted signal is a
transform of the original, highly redundant speech
signal, traces inevitably remain of the original speech
in the scrambled version, and the transmitted signal
is definitely not "noise-like". Analogue systems are
not discussed further here, and for further information
the reader is referred to [2] chapter g, [3], [5] and
l6J .
this system as System D. Thus purely from the cost and
complexity point of view, the higher bit rate system
(System D) is at a distinct advantage. It is assumed
for the purposes of this paper that System V uses a
vocoder operating at 2400 b/s and that System D uses
a delta-modulator operating at 16000 b/s.
The primary advantage of System V, i.e. the system
with a 2400 b/s bit rate, is that data at this rate
can be communicated using a narrow band channel, given
that a suitably sophisticated modem is available. In
many cases this means that a channel that is normally
used for clear speech (e.g. a standard telephone line
or a narrow band HF link) can also be used for
digitally encrypted speech; the ability to send secure
speech through such channels is something that is
normally associated only with analogue speech security
devices. This is a very important advantage, and
perhaps the major reason for the existence of vocoders.
There is associated with System V an inevitable decrease
in the redundancy contained in the transmitted data as
compared with higher bit rate systems such as System
D. This in turn affects the performance of the systems
in differing channel noise conditions. For example,
for a typical vocoder, performance starts to
deteriorate at an error rate of around 1%. If the bit
error probability is as high as 2% then noticeable
phonic corruption occurs; at error rates of 3-4% the
vocoder synchronisation becomes unreliable and even
when the vocoder is in synchronism the recovered
speech is virtually unintelligible. However, by adding
a modest amount of error protection redundancy to the
output from a vocoder (say 25%, which would increase
2400 b/s to 3000 b/s) such a system could be used over
channels with a significantly higher error rate. The
increase in bit rate is small enough for the system to
remain usable over most normal audio circuits.
However using a typical 16000 b/s delta-modulator, at
an error rate of 1% there is only a slight increase
in background noise in the demodulated speech, and
even at error rates as high as 10%, although the
background noise is comparable with that of a noisy
HF link, the recovered speech is still perfectly
comprehensible.
It is clear that both systems can tolerate a certain
error rate. In addition note that relatively small
changes in the error rate can make the difference
between perfectly adequate communications and no
communication at all. This is especially true for
System V, where, as noted above, doubling the error
rate from 1-2% to 2-4% can change the quality of the
recovered speech from virtually unaffected to almost
completely unintelligible. Thus it is worth stressing
that, for both System V and System D, any cipher
sys tem which propagates e'rrors wi 11 have the effect
of making certain channels, which are usable for clear
communications, unusable for secure communications.
3. DIGITAL ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES
~ Basic Concepts
Thus. to achieve the highest possible level of security
it is necessary to use a digital encryption system.
Such systems use an analogue to digital converter to
change the speech from an analogue signal into a
sequence of bits. This sequence of bits is then
enciphered (using similar techniques to those employed
in data encryption systems) and transmitted as an
encrypted sequence of bits. For further readin~ on
digital speech encryption systems see [1] .[2J chapter
9. [4] and [6].
The bit rate of a digital speech system (i.e the number
of bits transmitted by a device in every second of
operation) depends on the analogue to digital (A/D)
method used; this in turn affects the available options
for the encryption system. The different problems
associated with operating at low bit rates as compared
with medium bit rates form the subject matter for this
paper. In particular we consider and compare the
difficulties associated with designing a digital speech
encryptor operating at 2400 bits/second (b/s) and a
digital speech encryptor operating at 16000 b/s.
2. ANALOGUE TO DIGITAL CONVERSION TECHNIQUES
An A/D converter operating at a rate as low as 2400 b/s
is by necessity a sophisticated device such as a
vocoder; the low bit rate system considered here will
therefore be referred to as System V. An A/D system
operating at 16000 b/s could be a much simpler system
such as a delta-modulator, and we will thus refer to
In this section some of the terms that are to be used
are defined. The heart of every cryptographic system
is its encryption algorithm. In order to decide how
the clear information is to be encrypted, such
algorithms require one or more secret keys. The choice
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3.3 Stream Cipher Systems
...
The other widely used technique for enciphering
digitised speech is stream ciphering. Note that block
ciphers are not particularly suitable for speech
encryption because they not only propagate errors but
also introduce a time delay. A stream cipher system
is shown in block diagram form in Figure 2.
Stream ciphers require a separate synchronisation
signal. This is because the bit used to encipher (or
decipher) any bit of plaintext (or ciphertext) is a
function of the base key, message key and the position
of the bit within the ciphertext.
The major advantage of stream ciphers is that they do
not propagate errors. If any bit of encrypted speech
is received in error, then that is the only bit that
will be incorrect after decryption. Thus, in principle
at least, the use of a stream cipher technique makes
feasible a digital speech cipher which will enable
secure communication over any channel which allows
clear communication at the required bit rate.
The only remaining problem concerns obtaining crypto-
graphic synchronisation; this problem is not to be
underestimated. The purpose of synchronisation is to
ensure that the encryptor's and decryptor's sequence
generators (see Fig. 2) are running "in step". The
problem of obtaining synchronisation can be solved
however, and we consider possible methods for achieving
synchronism in Section 4 below.
It is clear from the above discussion that for most,
if not all, practical applications, encryption
techniques which propagate errors have clear user
disadvantages. Thus for both System V and System D,
given that the synchronisation problems can be over-
come, a stream cipher system (or some other encryption
system which does not propagate errors) is much to be
preferred.
4. METHODS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYNCHRONISATION
As detailed above, if a stream cipher technique is to
be used to secure the digital speech, a separate
cryptographic synchronisation scheme is required.
There are two types of synchronisation scheme in common
use, namely "Initial Synchronisation" (or "Single
Shot") systems and "Continuous Synchronisation" systems.
These systems are discussed and their respective pros
and cons are outlined in 4.1 and 4.2 below.
of algorithm is clearly of fundamental importance; the
requirements for such algorithms are not discussed here,
the interested reader is referred to [2J sections 4.4
and 4.5. However, the choice of algorithm must take
into account the amount of structure and redundancy in
the information being enciphered; as noted above,
vocoder output contains substantially less redundancy
than delta-modulator output, and so the requirements
for the algorithm may vary between the two systems.
As in [2J the term "base key" is used here for a key
which 1S selected by the user and changed by the user
at regular intervals; it will most probably be used
to encipher a number of different messages. In
conjunction with this base key it is also essential
to use some form of "message key", i.e. a key which
is different for each message and is normally
generated by the encryption device (and is transmitted
to the receiver at the start of an encrypted
transmission). For a discussion of why SUCR a key is
essential see, for example, [2J section 8.2.
In addition it may often be convenient to use a key
which changes very infrequently and actually changes
the function performed by the algorithm. Such keys
are usually included in order to allow the user to
"customise" corllnercially available equipment, and are
cOOU11only referred to as "customer option" keys.
3.2 Cipher Feedback Encryptors
One type of encryption system that could be used for
a digital speech encryption system is cipher feedback.
A cipher feedback system is shown in block diagram
form in Figure 1.
The major advantage of cipher feedback systems is
that they are "self-synchronising", i.e. no separate
synchronisation signal is required. This is because
the bit used to encipher (or decipher) any bit of
plaintext (or ciphertext) is a function only of the
base key and the previous n bits of ciphertext, and
not of its position within the ciphertext.
However this major advantage is also intimately
associated with the main disadvantage of cipher
feedback systems, namely error propagation. If any
bit of the enciphered speech is received in error,
not only will that bit be incorrect after deciphering,
but in addition between 0 and n of the next n bits will
also be in error after decryption. This is because the
bit used to decipher any received bit is a function of
the base key and the previous n ciphertext bits. Hence,
on average, each bit in error in transmission causes
(n/2)+1 errors in the deciphered data (e.g. if n=20,
then one error in transmission will cause around 11
errors in the deciphered bit sequence~).
This error propagation can easily degrade the
communications channel to such an extent that in clear
operation speech seems virtually unaffected by errors,
whereas it is not possible to communicate in secure.
As noted above, when using a vocoder over a channel
with a 1-2% error rate, a simple doubling of the error
rate can mean the difference between completely
satisfactory operation and complete loss of vocoder
synchronisation. As far as the user is concerned, for
radio links this can mean quite a severe range
reduction.
Because of this major problem, if the systems are ever
to be used over non-perfect channels (which is
normally the case with telephone and radio links) then
cipher feedback must be rejected as a possible
encryption scheme for both System V and System D. This
is especially true for System V where the AID method
is particularly sensitive to relatively small increases
in the error rate.
4.1 Initial Synchronisation
In these systems the transmitting device sends a single
block of synchronisation information at the start of
every transmission. This synchronisation block also
needs either to contain or be immediately followed by
the message key which provides one of the inputs to
the s~quence generator. Thereafter the receiving
(deciphering) unit uses a crystal controlled clock,
together with some form of timing recovery system, to
keep it in step with the transmitting (enciphering)
unit.
The chief advantage of this system is that, once the
synchronisation block has been transmitted, no extra
synchronisation information is sent. and the channel
can be dedicated to sending encrypted speech informa-
tion. This fact. combined with the use of a stream
cipher (or similar non-error-propagating system).
means that the channel will have exactly the same
characteristics for secure transmissions as for clear
transmissions; i.e. if the channel is good enough to
be usable in clear then it will be good enough to be
used in secure (given that the initial synchronisation
block is received).
Because of the importance of the initial synchron-
isation (and the need to transmit the message key
correctly) this block of data must be protected
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to use continuous synchronisation it is necessary to
"loseM blocks of data every so often, conunonly every
1-2 seconds. For a vocoder system, the loss of even a
short block could cause the receiving vocoder's
synchronisation to be temporarily lost; this would
result in a short but noticeable interruption in the
recovered speech. So System V is obliged to use initial
synchronisation because it does not "lose" any of the
data.
against transmission errors. The block must contain
sufficient error protection redundancy to ensure that
not only is it detected but also that the message key
is received correctly even in very bad error conditions.
Certainly the synchronisation system should work with
a very high probability in all those error conditions
in which there is even the remotest chance of receiving
intelligible speech.
The primary disadvantage of initial synchronisation
systems is that they do not allow "late entry". That
is, if a receiving device for some reason "misses.
the initial synchronisation (for example a third party
joining a net) then it is necessary for the user of
the receiving device to communicate to the transmitting
device that a new synchronisation block is required.
4.2 Continuous Synchronisation
In a continuous synchronisation system, the encrypted
output sequence is periodically interrupted for the
transmission of synchronisation updates; the period
between updates would normally be of the order of 1-2
seconds and the length of the update synchronisation
block would typically be of the order of 100-300 bits.
Every synchronisation update contains within it (or
directly associated with it) a new message key, so
that a receiver's sequence generator can be reloaded
with the same (new) set of keys as are being used by
the transmitting unit. Thus on receipt of any
synchronisation block a receiving unit is immediately
able to start decrypting the digitised speech data
following the synchronisation block.
A desirable feature for continuous synchronisation
systems is for each new message key to be a function
of the previous one (the initial message key being
randomly generated). This means that even if a
receiving unit fails to detect a synchronisation
update (or uses some inbuilt redundancy to detect that
the update has been received in error) then the
"expected" message key can be used to update the
receiver's sequence generator and decryption can
continue. This process is cOOB11Only known as "fly-
wheeling".
With System D the situation is somewhat different. The
insertion of a block of say 200 bits once every 1-2
seconds can be treated at the receiver so as to not
have a significant effect on the quality of the
recovered speech. What can be done for example is to
repeat the previously received block of 200 digitised
speech bits in order to fill in the gap left at the
receiver by the transmission of the synchronisation
block. With practical trials carried out using a
16000 b/s delta-modulator with 224-bit updates
occurring at intervals between 1.0 and 1.5 seconds,
such processing had a negligible effect on the
recovered speech quality.
Thus, because of the advantages of continous
synchronisation, this technique would seem to be the
more logical one to use for System D. To minimise the
speech degradation effects, the interval between
synchronisation updates needs to be maximised;
contrariwise the maximum time required for a receiver
to obtain synchronisation and start deciphering speech
data also needs to be minimised, and this time period
is equal to the maximum delay between synchronisation
updates. As a good compromise between these two
conflicting requirements, a delay between synchroni-
sation blocks of the order of 1-2 seconds would seem
reasonable.
It can be seen that, for a continuous synchronisation
scheme, redundancy should be added to each synchroni-
sation update to ensure that if it is received in
error then the receiver will not use the corrupted
message key but will use the "expected" message key;
this prevents temporary loss of cOlm1unication.
One of the main advantages of continuous synchronis-
ation is that it offers a late entry facility. It
offers an important additional advantage over single
shot systems when the transmission channel is subject
to varying noise conditions such as fades. If the
channel is especially bad during the initial synch-
ronisation, then the entire transmission will be lost,
whereas with a continuous synchronisation system, even
if the first few synchronisation signals are missed,
as soon as a receiving unit detects a synchronisation
update it can commence decrypting the enciphered
speech.
The main disadvantage of continuous synchronisation
is that "holes" have to be created in the encrypted
binary sequence in order to make room for the blocks
of synchronisation information. This can mean a
degradation in the recovered speech quality, the
actual effect depends to a very large extent on the
AID technique being employed.
4.3 Synchronisation r-'ethods for System V andSystem D -
'.
First consider System V. As was described above,
because of the advantages that it offers (in particular
late entry), continuous synchronisation is normally
to be preferred to initial synchronisation. However,
In the discussions above various conclusions have been
drawn as to the methods of encryption and synchroni-
sation which seem optimal for the two systems. These
conclusions are sunlnarised in Table 1.
As can be seen from the table, implementations of
System D require relatively unsophisticated AID
circuitry. A 16000 bls digital secure speech system
can, however, only be used over wide band channels
such as VHF radio links, and such links are normally
FM. For an FM link no modem is required, and thus,
apart from the radio itself and the encryption and
synchronisation circuitry, the whole system only
requires a relatively unsophisticated AID converter.
Such a converter (e.g. a delta-modulator) can be built
into a single small "encryption module" containing
everything required to "secure" a VHF radio. An
example of such a device is provided by the Raca1
Comsec MA4263 encryption module, a picture of which
is given in Figure 3, illustrating the small size of
the device. This small size is achieved by using
customised LSI circuits to miniaturise the sophisticated
encryption and synchronisation hardware. Because of
its small size and relatively low cost implementation,
the MM263 can be built into hand portable VHF radios.
The MA4263 uses a delta-modulator circuit for its AID
conversion, and encrypts the digitised speech data
using a stream cipher technique. Synchronisation is
achieved by the transmission of short synchronisation
blocks at pseudo-random intervals (the period between
sychronisation blocks 'varies between approximately
1.0 and 1.5 seconds). The synchronisation blocks
themselves are masked in order that they also appear
pseudo-random. The combination of pseudo-random timing
and pseudo-random appearance of synchronisation updates
makes selective synchronisation janlning extremely
difficult.
System V implementations have rather different
applications. Because the AID circuitry is far more
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TABLE 1 -A comparison of the two systems
System V System D
AID
technique
AID used is a vocoder
operating at 2400 b/s,
(a relatively sophisticated
technique)
AID used is a delta-modulator
operating at 16000 b/s,
(a relatively simple technique)
Type of
channel
Suitable for narrow band
channels (given a suitably
sophisticated modem).
Suitable only for wide band
channels (does not require a
sophisticated modem). '.
Encryption
technique
Stream cipher or other encryption
system which does not propagate
errors.
Stream cipher or other
encryption system which does
not propagate errors.
Synchronisation
system
Continuous synchronisation normally
preferable (minimal interference with
channel).
Single shot synchronisation
technique (no interference
with channel).
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complex, and thus more expensive, than for System D,
a device implementing System V would only normally be
used on narrow band links. In addition it would be
fair to say that with current techniques the speech
quality available from a fairly simple 16000 bls AID
is probably superior to that available from even the
most sophisticated 2400 b/s vocoder system.
Because of its narrow band application, a System V
implementation would also require a sophisticated
modem in order to be able to transmit the required
bit rate through the channel (e.g. a telephone or HF
link). Both the vocoder and the modem are likely to
be not only relatively expensive but also quite
bulky, and so miniaturisation of the System V
implementation is of lesser importance.
An example of a digital speech encryption device
incorporating the features of System V is the Racal
Comsec MA4433 full duplex vocoder encryptor. This
unit incorporates a stream cipher encryption algorithm
together with an initial "single shot" synchronisation
system. Given that synchronisation is not lost this
means that the encryption system can be used over all
links for which clear communication is viable.
The MA4433 encryption unit is housed in a half 19"
rack width extruded aluminium case; this unit includes
both the encryption and synchronisation circuitry.
Using a Racal Milgo Phoneplex 24 Vocoder, and a Racal
Milgo 2400 b/s full duplex, 2-wire, telephone modem,
a complete full duplex telephone encryption system can
be packaged into a 19R rack width configuration 5U high.
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igure 1 A Cipher feedback system
Fif1ure 2 A Stream Cipher
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Racal Comsec MA4263 encryption moduleFigure 3
